Help Stop Another Hostile Judicial Nominee
William Pryor's Nomination to the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Endangers
the Rights of People with Disabilities
Alabama Attorney General William Pryor is the latest of the Bush Administration's
controversial judicial nominees, to the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals.
He is scheduled to go before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary for
a hearing on Wednesday, June 11.
Like Jeffrey Sutton, Pryor has a long history of conservative extremism
and has worked to weaken and eliminate federal protections for people
with disabilities and other minorities. In fact, it was Pryor who hired
Sutton in the Garrett case, which significantly weakened ADA protections
against discrimination by the states.
Pryor's confirmation to a seat on the federal appeals court would undermine
the ability of people with disabilities to enforce important civil rights
protections given to them by Congress. Pryor has been an outspoken advocate
for states' rights and has fought aggressively to prevent people with
disabilities from enforcing their rights under the Americans with Disabilities
Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act against the states. He
has also spoken out in favor of legal arguments that would eliminate
the right of individuals to enforce their rights to obtain Medicaid services
that states are obligated to provide. Pryor is a member of the Federalist
Society and participates in other ultra-conservative think tanks that
promote a states' rights agenda.
Please phone, fax or email
(www.congress.org) your Senators
and Representative and ask them to vote "No" on
Pryor! ADA Watch will post a "Stop Pryor" petition
you can sign.
Bill Pryor's Record on Disability Issues
Bill Pryor, the Attorney General of Alabama, has been nominated by President
Bush to serve on the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The Eleventh
Circuit is comprised of Florida, Georgia and Alabama.
The ADA and Section 504
Pryor is perhaps best known for his advocacy in the case of Board of
Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,(1) which
severely limited the rights of people with disabilities to enforce the
ADA. Pryor
argued
in Garrett that Congress had no power under the Fourteenth Amendment
to apply Title I of the ADA to state employers. He brought in states'
rights advocate Jeffrey Sutton to help him make the case to the Supreme
Court. They persuaded the Supreme Court's conservative majority to rule,
in a 5-4 decision, that individuals with disabilities who are state employees
cannot sue their employers for damages under Title I of the ADA.
Pryor argued that Congress had no power to apply the ADA to the states
because "[i]n passing the ADA, Congress did not identify any pattern
or practice of unconstitutional State action, or for that matter, even
a single instance of such conduct." Despite the massive record of
egregious conduct toward individuals with disabilities by states that
Congress had compiled—including instances of forced sterilization
of individuals with disabilities, unnecessary institutionalization, denial
of education, and systemic prejudices and stereotyping perpetrated by
state actors —Pryor argued that states were actually in the forefront
of efforts to protect the rights of individuals with disabilities.
The Garrett case has had a much broader impact than simply precluding
ADA cases seeking money damages against state employers. In the wake
of Garrett, states have argued that the Supreme Court's reasoning applies
to Title II of the ADA, and many courts have accepted those arguments.
Additionally, states have argued that the ADA is not enforceable at all
against state entities, even in cases that do not involve damages. Some
courts have accepted those arguments.
Pryor has also argued that Congress had no power to apply Title II of
the ADA to state entities. In Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v.
Yeskey(2) and Medical Bd. of California v. Hason,(3)
Pryor filed amicus briefs with the Supreme Court arguing that Congress
had exceeded its Fourteenth Amendment
power in applying Title II to the states. In Yeskey, Pryor also challenged
Congress' power under the Commerce Clause to apply the ADA to state prisons.
He argued that the ADA had no application to state prisons at all. The
Supreme Court rejected that argument.
Pryor has also used federalism arguments to prevent people with disabilities
from enforcing their rights under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
Patricia Garrett, the plaintiff in the Garrett case, has been
litigating her employment discrimination claims against the University
of Alabama
since 1997. Because of Bill Pryor's efforts, she has been unable to have
any court review the merits of her claims that she was demoted because
she developed breast cancer. After Garrett's ADA claims were thrown out
by the Supreme Court, her remaining claims under Section 504 were thrown
out by the trial court based on Pryor's argument that Congress could
not require states to waive their immunity under Section 504 in exchange
for accepting federal funds.(4) Ms. Garrett
is appealing that ruling to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
Child Welfare
Bill Pryor attempted to scrap a consent decree between the state of
Alabama and a class of children in the state's child welfare system.
The consent decree, entered into several years before Pryor became
Attorney General, resolved constitutional and statutory claims challenging
deficiencies in the child welfare system and put in place much-needed
reforms. The named plaintiff, R.C., had been placed in the child welfare
system without attempts to provide appropriate services or supports
to him or his father. R.C. had mental health needs, but instead of
receiving appropriate services, he was repeatedly shunted by the child
welfare system from one psychiatric hospital to another and given large
doses of psychoactive medication.(5) The consent decree
required the state to do more to prevent children from being removed
from troubled
homes,
to provide appropriate services to children and their families, and
to prevent frequent transfers within the foster care system and their
resulting harms to children.
The consent decree had the effect of greatly reducing safety risks to
children, until the state dramatically cut back funding for care and
services and eliminated technical assistance and training, rolling back
progress. Bill Pryor freely admitted that the state had not complied
with the terms of the consent decree and said that prospects of future
compliance were dim. He sought to vacate the consent decree based on
legal arguments that the parties had committed a fraud on the court,
that the law had changed, and that the plaintiff class was too broad.
The court rejected these arguments, including Pryor's argument that the
former Governor, former Attorney General and other state officials had
conspired to defraud the court by entering into the consent decree.
After a hearing on the motion to vacate the consent decree, Pryor stated
publicly that "[i]t matters not to me" whether his actions
would leave children unprotected. He continued, "My job is to make
sure that the state of Alabama isn't run by federal courts. . . . My
job isn't to come here and help children."(6)
Medicaid
Bill Pryor has made public statements confirming his restrictive views
of the law. One notable example is a speech Pryor gave in 2001 praising
the reasoning of the district court decision in Westside Mothers
v. Haveman. (7) The district court ruled that Congress could not use its power under
the Spending Clause to authorize individuals to sue to obtain the services
to which they are entitled under the Medicaid program. As a result, impoverished
children and adults who were not getting basic medical care guaranteed
them under the Medicaid program were unable to enforce their rights.
This argument, which is far out of the mainstream of jurisprudence, was
ultimately rejected by the Sixth Circuit.
Pryor called the district court's decision "brilliant" and "sublime," and
expressed hope that he could participate in the "next phase" of "landmark
decisions" that would eliminate enforcement of Medicaid and other
similar Spending Clause laws. Pryor's views of the law expressed in that
speech would also eliminate individuals' ability to sue to enforce Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act.
Other Civil Rights Laws
Pryor's arguments in other high-profile civil rights cases have also
had a detrimental effect on disability rights advocacy. For example,
Pryor persuaded a 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court in Alexander
v. Sandoval (8);that individuals cannot sue to enforce regulations
under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that prohibit recipients
of federal
funds from engaging in conduct that has the effect of discriminating
based on race or national origin.
Since the Sandoval decision was issued, states have begun
to use its reasoning in efforts to persuade courts that people with
disabilities
should not be allowed to enforce regulations under the ADA and Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act requiring reasonable accommodations, integration
of individuals with disabilities, and accessible public housing.(9)
Pryor also argued to the Supreme Court that state entities cannot be
sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)(10) and
the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).(11) The
Supreme Court accepted his argument
with respect to the ADEA, but rejected the argument he made in an amicus
brief with respect to the FMLA. These arguments are similar to the ones
Pryor made with respect to the ADA in Garrett and Hason, and continue
to be used in ADA Title II cases.
Take Action
Contact your Senators and Representative today and ask them to vote against William Pryor's nomination to the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals.
Notes
1. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
2. 524 U.S. 206 (1998).
3. No. 02-479, cert. dismissed, 173 S.Ct. 1779 (2003).
4. Garrett v. University of Alabama at Birmingham Bd. of Trustees,
223 F. Supp.2d 1244 (N.D. Ala. 2002).
5. R.C. v. Nachman, 969 F. Supp. 682, 685 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
6. Pryor: Only Legal Concerns, Says He Can't Judge If Welfare Settlement
Helped Children, Birmingham News, May 7, 1997, at 1-B.
7. 133 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Mich. 2001), rev'd, 289 F.3d, 852 (6th
Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 618 (2002).
8. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
9. See, e.g., Three Rivers Center for Independent Living, Inc. v.
Housing Authority of City of Pittsburgh, No. 02-1069 (W.D. Pa.
May 14, 2003) (Section 504 regulations requiring a certain percentage
of newly constructed
or altered public housing to be accessible to people with disabilities
unenforceable based on Sandoval); Sabree v. Houstoun,
245 F. Supp.2d 653 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (appeal pending) (finding Medicaid
provisions requiring
services to be furnished with reasonable promptness unenforceable based
on legal reasoning set forth in Sandoval and expanded upon in a later
Supreme Court decision, Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002)).
10. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
11. Nevada Dep't of Human Resources v. Hibbs, No. 01-1368,
2003 WL 21210426 (May 27, 2003).
|