Posted March 31, 2004
Fact Sheet: Handling Fair Housing Act Disability Claims in
the Context of an Imminent or Pending Eviction Action
Where to file a Fair Housing Act claim when
eviction proceedings are pending in state court: A lawyer’s dilemma
Ralph, who has a mental illness, requires the assistance
of a support animal to ameliorate the effects of his disability. Unfortunately,
his landlord has rejected Ralph’s requests for a reasonable accommodation to
keep his animal and has issued him an eviction notice for violating the apartment
complex’s “no pets” policy. Because Ralph has refused to vacate his apartment,
the landlord has started eviction proceedings against him in state court. Ralph
visits Lily, a legal services attorney, for her assistance with this case.
Lily realizes Ralph has a claim[1] under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq.,
which gives her several options to consider in her representation of Ralph’s
eviction case.
First, Lily may litigate this case in state court as defenses
and counterclaims to the eviction proceeding. A minority of state courts require
a defendant to present his defenses in that forum. Unfortunately, state courts
are sometimes inhospitable forums for FHA claims because the judges lack expertise
in civil rights law and view these claims as complicated. Accordingly, Lily
may choose a more favorable forum.
Second, Lily may file an affirmative case with the landlord’s
case in a court of general jurisdiction, where Lily can ask that the landlord’s
claims and Ralph’s claims be joined. Although no jury and no discovery would
be allowed in such a court, broader equitable relief may be attainable.
Third, Lily may choose to file an administrative complaint
with the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which
is responsible for enforcing the FHA.[2] While having HUD investigate may give Ralph some leverage in
negotiating with the landlord, HUD cannot tell the landlord to stop the eviction.
Filing a HUD complaint is not required before pursuing an action in federal
court, but it will not change or terminate Ralph’s eviction case.
Last, Lily may choose to file a lawsuit in federal court
alleging discrimination under the FHA.[3] This lawsuit must be filed within two years of the date the
discrimination occurred.[4] Federal
court is probably the ideal forum in which to litigate Ralph’s complaint because
federal judges are familiar with FHA claims. However, pursuing a claim in federal
court does not mean a landlord will stop an eviction action that is proceeding
in state court.
If an eviction proceeding is occurring in state court, Lily
may encounter difficulties in presenting Ralph’s FHA claims to a federal court
because of abstention doctrines and the Anti-Injunction Act. The doctrine of
abstention bars federal courts from deciding matters where the relief sought
would require the court to determine that a state court judgment was incorrect
or to take action that would render the state court action ineffectual.
Relevant law
When judicial proceedings concerning the same parties and
arising from the same operative nucleus of fact but asserting different claims
are filed in federal and state court, jurisdictional problems may arise. If
the parties do not raise the question of whether a court has subject matter
jurisdiction over the claims before it, a court can raise this question sua
sponte.[5] Furthermore, a
court may address jurisdictional questions for the first time on appeal.[6] A
plaintiff should therefore be ready to assert the court’s jurisdiction over
its claims and respond to the court’s concerns about abstention doctrines.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine,[7] the Younger abstention doctrine[8] and the Anti-Injunction Act[9] may all affect whether a federal court will
hear a plaintiff’s claims.
Rooker-Feldman doctrine
If an eviction proceeding has already been litigated in
state court, a party might raise the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in federal court.
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal courts generally lack jurisdiction
over challenges to state court judgments or over general constitutional claims
that are “inextricably intertwined”[10] with claims already adjudicated in state court.[11] The doctrine is based on the
rule that within the federal system only the United States Supreme Court has
the authority to review a state court judgment.[12] The
doctrine applies if granting the plaintiff the requested relief would require
a federal court to determine the state court judgment was incorrect or to take
action that would cause the state court decision to be ineffectual.[13] The
Rooker-Feldman doctrine thus precludes plaintiffs from bringing straightforward
appeals and indirect challenges that might undermine state court judgments.
Federal courts are likely to apply the Rooker-Feldman doctrine if they perceive
that a plaintiff is attempting to reverse her eviction proceedings
by masking her suit as a civil rights claim and claiming money damages.[14] Accordingly,
if a party is going through an eviction proceeding in state court, she should
bring in all of her counterclaims inextricably intertwined to the claim or
a federal court will refuse to hear them.[15]
Some courts hold that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies
only to final judgments; however, others hold that the doctrine also applies
to interlocutory orders.[16] Courts
have ruled that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine even applies when a federal court
is asked to review the actions of a state court that a party alleges were unconstitutional.[17] The Third Circuit has developed an exception to this rule and
allows a plaintiff in federal actions to challenge a state court action he
alleges was unconstitutional if the plaintiff was not a party in the state
court proceeding.[18]
Several exceptions to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine have developed.
One federal court held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine was not implicated
where a plaintiff had already presented her discrimination claims in an unsuccessful
motion for summary judgment in state court.[19] This court determined there had been not state
court judgment on the discrimination issue.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to the court’s
consideration of a “federal claim alleging a prior injury that a state court
failed to remedy.”[20] However,
the doctrine does apply to a federal claim alleging injury from a state court
decision.[21] The doctrine does not apply if the plaintiff
presents a claim that is independent of a state court’s decision[22] or if the plaintiff did not
have a reasonable opportunity to present her federal claim in state court.[23] Furthermore, in some jurisdictions if a state
proceeding alleging a violation of a plaintiff’s constitutional rights occurs
in a court of limited jurisdiction that does not have the power to award money
damages, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar a federal court from hearing
a claim seeking monetary damages for violation of those rights.[24]
Federal courts may make an exception to the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine if a party learns that she was defrauded by the opposing party and
such fraud prevented her from raising her claims.[25] Other courts, however, have held that a showing
of fraud is insufficient to defeat the doctrine and have required a showing
of some factor independent of the opposing party’s actions that prevented her
from raising her federal claims.[26]
If a federal court accepts jurisdiction, issue-preclusion
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel create additional
barriers for a plaintiff to overcome. Res judicata is an affirmative
defense and mandates that the federal court grant a state court decision the
same preclusive effect it would have in state court.[27] Therefore the federal court may have to apply
state law to determine whether res judicata bars the plaintiff’s claims.[28] Collateral
estoppel prevents a party from re-litigating an issue that was decided in a
previous proceeding if that party had an opportunity to litigate the issue
in the first proceeding. Collateral estoppel may be applied when the two proceedings
involve different causes of action. To argue that collateral estoppel does
not apply to an issue, a plaintiff might argue that this issue was not actually
litigated or was not necessarily decided in court.
Younger Abstention Doctrine
If an eviction proceeding is being litigated in state court
when the federal claim is filed, a party might raise the Younger abstention
doctrine. Under this doctrine, federal courts should abstain in favor of pending
state judicial proceedings, absent extraordinary circumstances. Abstention
is proper if: (1) the complaint constitutes the basis of an ongoing[29] state judicial[30] proceeding, (2) the proceeding implicates important state interests,
and (3) an adequate opportunity exists in the state proceeding to raise constitutional
challenges.[31] If all three
prongs are satisfied, a federal court should abstain unless it detects “bad
faith, harassment, or some extraordinary circumstance that would make abstention
inappropriate.”[32]
Under this federalism doctrine, the federal government tries
to protect federal rights and interests in a manner that does not improperly
interfere with legitimate activities of the state. Federal courts may abstain
to allow state courts to decide underlying issues of state statutory law, particularly
if the state court interpretation may foreclose the need to review some of
the plaintiff’s federal claims.[33] Although Younger may prohibit courts
from ordering declaratory or injunctive relief that would interfere with a
state proceeding, a court may still have jurisdiction over a damages claim,
unless the damages claim would require a declaration that a state statute is
unconstitutional.[34]
Under the second prong of Younger, a federal court
will abstain if the proceeding concerns important state interests. Recently,
some federal courts have held that Younger abstention does not apply
when a state court proceeding concerns an eviction because “important state
interests” are not at stake.[35] In Brooklyn
Institute of Arts & Sciences v. City of New York, 64 F. Supp. 2d 184,
194 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), the court stated that an “ejectment action” is merely
“a landlord-tenant action that is routinely available in disputes between private
parties,” does not “uniquely [further] the state court’s ability to perform
their judicial functions,” and “does not involve any important state interests.”[36] Other courts have disagreed and found evictions to be complicated
procedures heavily regulated by state law where the state has an interest in
the defenses raised.[37]
Second Circuit courts, in particular, invoke the Younger abstention
doctrine as an exception rather than a rule. In the Second Circuit, courts
determine whether “important state interests” are implicated by examining whether
“the state action concerns the central sovereign functions of state government.”[38] The
court examines the significance of the “generic proceedings to the State” rather
than the state’s “interest in the outcome of the particular case.”[39]
Under the third prong of Younger, a federal court
will abstain if an adequate opportunity exists in the state proceeding to raise
constitutional challenges. A court will look at not only whether the plaintiff
did, in fact, raise the defense, but whether the state law allowed the plaintiff
to raise the defense. In Newell v. Rolling Hills Apartments, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3598 (N.D. Iowa 2001), a federal court stayed an action before
it, seeking injunctive relief to stop a landlord from evicting a tenant. The
federal court rejected the tenant’s argument that she could not raise a discrimination
defense in state court and deferred to the state court to determine whether
Iowa law allowed such a defense to a forcible entry and detainer action.[40]
Last, the court will look for extraordinary circumstances
to determine whether or not it should abstain. Such circumstances may include
situations in which the court is “incompetent, biased, or otherwise incapable
of fairly interpreting the statute in question.”[41] A person pursuing a disability discrimination
claim may be able to document that the state court is not “disability friendly”
and argue for the federal court to take jurisdiction of the case.
Anti-Injunction Act
When a party initiates a case under the FHA in
federal court, she might ask the federal court to stay proceedings in the state
court with an injunction. The power of the federal court to enjoin such proceedings
may be limited by the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1990), which holds
that a federal court “may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a
State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary
in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” The
Anti-Injunction Act does not prevent the court from issuing injunctions against
the institution of state court proceedings but only bars injunctions against
ongoing proceedings.[42] Although
federal courts may not be able to enjoin state court proceedings, some may
be able to enjoin the parties themselves from proceeding with the eviction.
A Fifth Circuit decision, however, prohibits courts from enjoining both parties
and state courts under the Anti-Injunction Act.[43]
The leading case describing when an injunction is “necessary
in aid of [a court’s] jurisdiction” is Atlantic Coast Line Rail Co. v. Brotherhood
of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281 (1970). Under Atlantic Coast Line, "federal
injunctive relief may be required to prevent a state court from so interfering
with a federal court's consideration or disposition of a case as to seriously
impair the federal court's flexibility and authority to decide that case."[44] Applying Atlantic
Coast Line’s reasoning, a federal court issued an injunction “in aid of
its jurisdiction” in an eviction case where the tenants would not have been
allowed to bring their defenses, which were at the heart of the case, in state
court.[45] Had the federal
court not issued an injunction in this case, the court would have been bound
by the state court’s decision and would not have been able to grant relief
to the tenant without further upsetting the state court’s ruling and raising
greater federalism concerns.[46]
Basic advice to navigate around abstention doctrines and the Anti-Injunction
Act
1. Plaintiffs should
try to incorporate their constitutional claims, such as equal protection, due
process and the FHA, into their defense at the state level in case a federal
court might decide they were “inextricably intertwined” with the state court
proceeding.
2. Plaintiffs should
try to remove state claims to federal court before the state court decides
on the eviction proceeding. However, if a district court determines the claims
were improperly removed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1447
(c), that decision would not be reviewable on appeal.[47]
3. A party asserting
collateral estoppel as a defense holds the burden of showing that the identical
issue was previously decided while the other party holds the burden of showing
that it lacked a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue.[48] A
party may argue that the issue was not litigated at the state level if the
state dismissed the suit due to the statute of limitations.
4. Even if there
is no outright fraud at the state level, Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp.,
182 F.3d 548 (7th Cir. 1999), could be used to argue that a tenant-plaintiff
cannot be prevented from fully litigating her claim. Thus, external factors
that may have affected the state court’s holding should be considered at the
federal level.
5. Plaintiffs should
look into bringing potential claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act (“FDCPA”),as this claim cannot be brought as a defense in many state courts.
6. The plaintiff
must characterize the injury as not having an opportunity to litigate the claim
rather than the unfavorable outcome of the state proceeding.
7. Plaintiffs
should see whether the state court allows discrimination claims to be brought
when
defending against eviction claims. If the state court does not allow such a
defense, then the plaintiff would have standing for the claim in federal court.
If not, then the Younger abstention doctrine will apply.
8. If a plaintiff
is filing her action in federal court but state eviction proceedings have not
commenced, she should request a stay of potential state court eviction proceedings
in her complaint to avoid the restrictions of the Anti-Injunction Act.[49]
For more information: E-mail: mallen@relmanlaw.co .
Website: www.bazelon.org.
Endnotes
[1] 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (f)(3)(B)
[5] See Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. 137 (1803).
[6] Doctor’s Assocs., Inc.
v. Distajo, 107 F.3d 126, 137 (2d Cir. 1997).
[7] This doctrine developed
from two Supreme Court cases, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.
413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
U.S. 462 (1983).
[8] This doctrine was first
articulated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
[9] Anti-Injunction Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2283 (1990).
[10] See also Pennzoil
Co. v. Texaco, Inc, 481 US. 1, 25 (1987) (Marshall, J. concurring)
(A federal claim is inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment
“if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court
wrongly decided the issue before it.”); Karamoko v. New York City Hous.
Auth., 170 F. Supp. 2d 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), citing Moccio v. New
York State Office of Court Admin., 95 F.3d 195, 199-200 (2d Cir. 1996)
(interpreting a claim as “inextricably intertwined” if a plaintiff had
the opportunity to raise it in state court and it would be barred under
issue preclusion).
[11] Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983) (stating
U.S. Supreme Court has sole authority to review state court judgments).
[13] FOCUS v. Allegheny
County Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 840 (3d Cir. 1992).
[14] See Chambers v.
The Habitat Co., 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 11569, at *7 (7th Cir. 2003).
[15] Id., at *5 (refusing
to hear § 1983 action challenging violation of due process rights for omitting
language from lease required by HUD regulations because that claim was germane
to dispute over possession and could have been raised in state court.)
[16] Doctor’s Assocs.,
Inc. v. Distajo, 107 F.3d 126, 137-38 (2d Cir. 1997), Plymouth & Brockton
Street Railway Co. v. Leyland, 941 F. Supp. 14, 16 (D. Mass. 1996). See
also Dubinka v. Judges of Superior Court, 23 F.3d 218, 221 (9th
Cir. 1994); Port Auth. Police Benev. Ass’n, Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y.
and N.J. Police Dep’t, 973 F.2d 169, 177 (3d Cir. 1992). But see Matter
of Meyerland Co., 960 F.2d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1992).
[17] See Burch
v. Billingtier, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4975 (E.D.Pa. 2003) (holding
court could not review actions of state court judges that allegedly violated
plaintiff’s due process rights).
[18] FOCUS v. Allegheny
County Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 840-41 (3d Cir. 1996).
[19] Andujar v Hewitt,
2002 WL 1792065, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
[20] Long v. Shorebank
Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting Centres, Inc.
v. Town of Brookfield, 148 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 1998)
[21] See, e.g., Thomas
v. 5445 Edgewater Plaza Condominium Ass’n, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 4126,
at *4 (7th Cir. 2000) (barring § 1983 due process claim regarding improper
notice because the injury was caused by state court’s decision on eviction
matter).
[22] Long v. Shorebank
Dev. Corp 182 F.3d at 548. (holding that claims under Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act but not due process claims were independent of
state court judgment).
[23] Wood v. Orange County,
715 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1983) (Rooker-Feldman does not apply to claims that
state law does not allow a defendant to raise, even if the claims touch upon
the state court claim).
[24] Karamoko v. New
York City Hous. Auth., 170 F. Supp. 2d 372, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
[25] Long v. Shorebank
Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548 (7th Cir. 1999) (reversing district court’s
judgment dismissing claims under Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Rooker-Feldman
doctrine did not preclude plaintiff’s federal claim because she could not
have brought fraud as a defense in state court).
[26] Kropelnicki v. Siegel,
290 F. 3d 118 (2d Cir. 2002) (such factors may include state court action
or state court procedures that have barred litigants from presenting claims).
[27] Full Faith and Credit
Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
[28] See Karamoko v.
New York City Hous. Auth., 170 F. Supp. 2d 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (applying
New York state law to determine that claim barred since dismissal on grounds
of statute of limitations operates as dismissal on merits for res judicata).
[29] See, e.g., New
Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. New Orleans, 491 US. 350, 358 (1989) (finding
that a state proceeding is ongoing if it is pending “at the time the federal
court enters its order regarding abstention.”) If a state court proceeding
has terminated, it is not considered to be ongoing. Thus, the Younger abstention
doctrine would not apply but the Rooker-Feldman doctrine might be applicable.
If state judicial proceeding has been deferred pending entry of the federal
court’s decision on abstention, the state proceeding is considered to be
ongoing. See Harmon v. City of Kansas City, Mo., 197 F.3d
321, 325 (8th Cir. 1999); Newell v. Rolling Hills Apartments, 134
F. Supp. 2d 1026 (N.D. Iowa 2001).
[30] The Younger doctrine
has been extended to preclude federal courts from interfering in pending
state administrative proceedings which are judicial in nature. See Ohio
Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 627
(1986); Middlesex County Ethics Comm’n, 457 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1987).
[31] Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971).
[32] Middlesex County
Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 435 (1982).
[33] Huffman v. Pursue,
Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 603 (1975).
[34] Yamaha Motor Corp.
v. Stroud, 179 F.3d 598, 603 (8th Cir 1999).
[35] Brooklyn Inst. of
Arts & Sciences v. City of New York, 64 F. Supp. 2d 184, 194 (E.D.N.Y.
1999); Andujar v. Hewitt, 2002 WL 1792065, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
[37] Newell v. Rolling
Hills Apartments, 134 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1035 (N.D. Iowa 2001).
[38] Philip Morris, Inc.
v. Blumenthal, 123 F.3d 103, 106 (2d. Cir. 1997).
[39] Scheiner v. New
York Health & Hospitals Corp., 1999 WL 771383, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 28, 1999) (citing New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New
Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 365 (1989).
[40] Newell v. Rolling
Hills Apartments, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 1038.
[41] Yamaha Motor Corp.
v. Stroud, 179 F.3d 598, 603 (8th Cir. 1999).
[42] Dombrowski v. Pfister,
380 U.S. 479, 484 n.2 (1965).
[43] Tampa Phosphate
R. Co. v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co., 418 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1969)
(holding “§ 2283 applies irrespective of whether the federal injunction
is directed to parties or to the state courts.”)
[44] Atlantic Coast Line
Rail Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 298 U.S. 281, 295
(1970).
[45] See Peggy Lattimore
v. Northwest Cooperative Homes Ass’n., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3285,
at *14 (1990) (Plaintiff sued to reassert her rights to Section 8 assistance
and succession rights to her father’s membership in a housing cooperative).
[47] See Hamilton
v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 5 F.3d 642, 644 (2d Cir. 1993).H
[48] Karamoko v. New
York City Hous. Auth., 170 F. Supp. 2d 372, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
[49] See Peggy Lattimore
v. Northwest Cooperative Homes Ass’n., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3285 (1990).
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