United States Court of Appeals

Community Services, Inc. v. Wind Gap Municipal Authority,
421 F.3d 170 (3rd Cir. 2005), reversing 2004 WL 764793 (E.D. Pa. April 1, 2004)
Keys: Z-FAM, Z-UTL
Community Services, Inc., a for-profit corporation, leased a house that it used to provide caretaker services to three women with disabilities. A municipal sewer agency thereafter reclassified the house as a “personal care home,” imposing increased sewer fees and administrative burdens on CSI beyond those that would be charged for other residential uses. CSI sued under the Fair Housing Act, claiming that the term “personal care home” was a proxy for handicapped status and that the agency’s sewer regulations were thus facially discriminatory.
The court of appeals reversed the district court and awarded summary judgment in the agency’s favor. The court ruled that the relevant regulations did not satisfy the proxy test because the term “personal care home” had been left undefined and thus could apply to any number of groups that did not satisfy the FHA’s definition of people with disabilities. The court also found that by classifying a “personal care home” as “commercial,” the agency did not suggest an intention to discriminate “because of” disabled status but merely recognized the commercial nature of CSI. The court additionally found unpersuasive CSI’s suggestion that by burdening it and other similarly situated organizations with higher fees, the number of residences available for people with disabilities would be reduced. The court stated that no evidence had been put forth suggesting that such a reduction in housing opportunities would result from the agency’s actions.

Three Rivers Center for Independent Living, Inc. v. Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh,
382 F.3d 412 (3rd Cir. 2004)
Keys: O-ACC
Current and prospective public housing tenants with disabilities brought suit against the housing authority, challenging its failure to provide accessible public housing pursuant to HUD regulations promulgated to enforce Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The regulations require housing authorities, inter alia, to ensure that at least 5 percent of their units are fully accessible to people with mobility impairments. The district court dismissed the action to the extent that it sought to enforce the HUD regulations, finding that no private right of action existed to enforce those regulatory standards for accessibility.
The court of appeals, on different grounds, affirmed the district court’s ruling. The court held that implied rights of action may be used only to enforce personal rights, i.e. those rights intentionally and unambiguously conferred through rights-creating language. After finding that Section 504 contained an implied right of action, the court ruled that only  suits seeking to enforce personal rights could be brought under the statute. Finally, the court held that the HUD regulations at issue here did not articulate any personal rights, but rather merely created systemic rights. As a result, no suit could be brought to enforce the regulations, whether or not they had properly construed Section 504’s requirements.

NEW JERSEY

New Jersey State Courts

Oras v. The Housing Authority of the City of Bayonne
373 N.J. Super. 302, 861 A.2d 194 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004)
Keys: L-ACC, O-ACC
A state trial court granted summary judgment for the housing authority, dismissing the tenant’s complaint that the authority had failed to provide a handicap-accessible apartment and allow him to keep a dog that assisted him with daily activities. The trial court found that the tenant had failed to submit an application to enroll in the low-income housing program, a necessary precondition to rent in the Authority’s housing division that had handicapped-accessible units available and, therefore, that he had not been discriminated against when denied the apartment. The appellate division reversed, holding that the tenant’s failure to submit an application did not dispose of his claim that the authority was aware of his request for a handicap-accessible apartment. The court noted that the authority’s failure to inform the plaintiff that he had to complete an application for the then-available handicapped unit may have been a failure to reasonably accommodate the plaintiff’s disability, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. The appellate court also found that the trial court’s conclusion that the plaintiff knew of the Authority’s pet policy was an inappropriate finding of fact on summary judgment. Noting that a landlord may not relieve himself of the responsibilities of reasonable accommodations by having a tenant waive his right in a lease, the court found that whether an animal is of sufficient assistance to a tenant to require a landlord to relax its pet policy requires a fact-sensitive determination and a cost-benefit balancing that takes both parties’ needs into account, and also remanded this issue to the trial court.

Alliance for Disabled in Action v. Continental Props.
853 A.2d 328 (N.J. App. Div. 2004)
Keys: O-ACC
The Alliance for Disabled in Action (ADA) sued developers and other parties of an apartment complex, alleging that the complex was constructed in violation of New Jersey’s Barrier-Free Subcode, N.J.A.C. § 5:23-7.1 et seq., and that the failure to design and construct it in accordance with barrier-free standards constituted acts of discrimination under the state Law Against Discrimination, N.J.A.C. § 10:5-1 et seq.
The plaintiff filed its initial complaint in 1999. A bench trial was held in which the court ordered reconstruction and retrofitting of certain features, rejected the plaintiff’s contention that other features violated the subcode, and awarded attorney’s fees to the plaintiff. On appeal, the Appellate Division held that the trial court correctly used the date  the certificate of occupancy was issued as the triggering date for calculating the period of limitations. It also held that there is no inherent bar to application of the continuing-violation doctrine to a case alleging disability discrimination because of inaccessibility. Note: This is a companion case to Alliance for Disabled in Action v. Renaissance Enters., 853 A.2d 334 (N.J. App. Div. 2004).

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