Digest of Cases and Other Resources on Fair Housing for People with Disabilities |
Second Judicial Circuit |
This page was updated on 3/7/06. |
United States Court of Appeals
Tsombanidis v. West Haven Fire Department
352 F.3d 565 (2d Cir. 2003), affirming in part and reversing in part, 180 F.Supp.2d 262 (D.Conn. 2001) and 208 F.Supp.2d 263 (D.Conn. 2002)
Keys: Z-SAF
An owner and residents of group home for recovering alcoholics and drug addicts brought action against the city and its fire district for discriminatory enforcement of the zoning regulations, property maintenance code and state building code, in violation of the Fair Housing Act and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Those enforcement efforts and the imposition of fire- and life-safety rules were triggered by complaints from neighbors to the city and fire-district officials. The trial court held that the fire code had a disparate impact on residents, and that the city had engaged in intentional discrimination, created disparate impact and failed to reasonably accommodate residents' handicap. The court awarded damages and attorney's fees. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the fire-safety regulations did not have disparate impact on residents and that the fire district's alleged refusal to treat the home as a one-family dwelling was not a failure to reasonably accommodate residents. On the other hand, the court determined that the city had engaged in intentional discrimination and failed to extend zoning and land-use accommodations that were necessary under the FHA and the ADA.
United States v. Space Hunters
429 F.3d 416 (2d Cir. 2005), affirming in part, vacating in part and remanding, 2004 WL 2674608 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
Keys: P-PRC, L-SCR
The U.S. Department of Justice brought suit against Space Hunters, a New York corporation that provides lists of rental properties to prospective tenants, and its owner and sole employee, alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act for its refusal to communicate with a deaf man through the use of a relay-service operator. The court denied the defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law. The defendants claimed that they did not have time to talk over the phone with hundreds of customers every day and so refused to talk to any customers, but admitted to asking questions of non-deaf potential customers over the phone. Because the owner exhibited overt animus toward people with disabilities, made it clear he would not comply with the FHA and had a history of contempt with respect to prior court and administrative orders, the court imposed a stringent injunction on the company’s future operations and required a lengthy period of monitoring by the Justice Department. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the finding of intentional discrimination, and revived other elements of DOJ’s complaint for further proceedings before the trial court.
CONNECTICUT
Connecticut State Courts
CHRO ex rel. Westphal and Sanchez v. Brookstone Court, LLC
2006 WL 463262 (Conn.Super. Feb. 15, 2006)
Keys: L-MDF L-ACC L-SCR
Kathy Sanchez and her roommate, inquired about renting an apartment. When it was revealed that Sanchez uses a wheelchair and intended to build a ramp for access to a first-floor unit, the rental manager responded, “that’s not going to work, it’s not possible.” The Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO) issued a charge of discrimination on the basis of disability and refusal to permit reasonable modification of the premises and the defendants elected to have the case heard in the state court. That court, confusing the concepts of “reasonable modification” and “reasonable accommodation,” found that Sanchez had established a prima facie case of discrimination based upon a failure to reasonably accommodate, because she had shown (1) she had a disability as defined by the state fair housing statute; (2) the defendant knew of her disability; (3) the ramp and other accommodations “may be necessary” to afford her an equal opportunity to use the dwelling; and (4) the defendant refused to make accommodations. The court concluded that Sanchez was entitled to compensatory and emotional distress damages of $10,000 and imposed a civil penalty of $1,000.
NEW YORK
New York State Courts
Angelo J. Mellino Ctr. for Mental Health v. Denise B.
777 N.Y.S.2d 830 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 2004)
Keys: L-EVI, O-PLC, L-SER
An agency licensed to provide subsidized housing and treatment to homeless people with mental health problems brought holdover proceedings against two residents who failed to comply with program treatment requirements. The agency licensed subsidized housing to residents pursuant to a written agreement requiring, among other conditions, participation in mental health, substance abuse and medical treatment, and stated that failure to abide by its terms would result in immediate discharge from the program. The trial court held that the agency could require licensees to participate in treatment programs as a condition of receiving subsidized housing under the Shelter Plus Care program, created pursuant to the McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11403-11407b. The court further found that the residents’ failure to comply with the terms of the license agreement permitted the agency to evict them.
Landmark Properties v. Olivo,
783 N.Y.S. 2d 745 (N.Y. App. 2004)
Keys: L-EVI L-PTS
In this appeal of an eviction case, the state appellate court held that a tenant requesting permission to have an emotional support dog to assist with his depression and anxiety had not met his burden of demonstrating that keeping the dog would in fact be necessary to his enjoyment of his rental unit. The case turned on the court’s finding that the tenant submitted only ambiguous statements by his physician that people with depression may benefit from having pets and notes from his medical record that he was anxious about possibly losing his dog. The court held that, “even assuming arguendo that tenant Olivo's anxiety, depression and physical ailments as described in the record constitute a ‘physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of [his] major life activities,’ the record is not sufficient to demonstrate that keeping a dog would in fact be necessary to his enjoyment of the subject premises.” As a result, the appellate court affirmed an order of eviction.
Significance: This case and the Prindable case (see Hawaii, below) are emblematic of a growing problem in cases involving emotional support animals. The quality of evidence offered by plaintiffs in such cases is directly related to their success. Here, although represented by counsel, the plaintiff failed to put on sufficient evidence and was unable to prevail.
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