Second Judicial Circuit
Babalola v. B.Y. Equities Inc.
63 Fed. Appx. 534 , 2003 WL 1868478
(2d Cir. April 11, 2003)
L-EVI
Babalola, an evicted tenant, brought suit in a New York district
court against a property management company and other defendants.
Babalola's complaint alleged a discriminatory conspiracy to evict
her from her apartment in violation of the Fair Housing Act and
other civil rights. In a report to the district court, a magistrate
judge concluded that the court lacked jurisdiction to review Babalola's
claims because of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which forbids federal
courts from considering claims that are "inextricably intertwined" with
prior state-court determinations (see Rooker v. Fidelity Trust
Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of
Appeal v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The magistrate judge reasoned
that, in order to find that Babalola's eviction resulted from discriminatory
conspiracy, the district court would have to hold that the New
York State housing court erred in issuing a warrant for her eviction
based on nonpayment of rent, that the Appellate Term erred in affirming
that decision, and that the Appellate Division erred in denying
leave to appeal. The magistrate concluded that Babalola's claims
were "inextricably intertwined" with the state-court
decisions and consequently barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Acting on this report, the district court concluded that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction and granted the defendants' motion
for summary judgment. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision.
Pathways v. Dunne
329 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2003)
Z-OPP
Pathways, a provider of residential services, encountered
strong resistance from neighbors and from the City of Greenwich
to its
plan to renovate a large home as a residence for people with psychiatric
disabilities. While three separate lawsuits were pending in state
court (two filed by neighborhood opponents and one by the provider),
Pathways filed a lawsuit in federal court, alleging violation of
the Fair Housing Act. The court dismissed the organization's motions
for declaratory and injunctive relief against the city, and denied
its motion for preliminary injunction against the neighbors, citing
the restrictions in the federal Anti-Injunction Act and the Younger
abstention doctrine. On appeal, the court held that because the
state court litigation had concluded, there was no bar to the federal
claim. The matter was remanded to the trial court with instructions
to reconsider the claims for declaratory, injunctive and monetary
relief against the neighborhood opponents.
Significance: Federal
courts have developed a number of doctrines intended to prevent
unnecessary involvement in legal disputes in
state courts. The Anti-Injunction Act prohibits the entry of injunctions
that interfere with state judicial proceedings. Under the Younger
abstention doctrine, federal courts should abstain in favor of
pending state judicial proceedings, except in extraordinary circumstances.
Abstention is proper if: (1) the complaint constitutes the basis
of an ongoing state judicial proceeding, (2) the proceeding implicates
important state interests, and (3) an adequate opportunity exists
in the state proceeding to raise constitutional challenges. Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). If all three prongs are satisfied,
a federal court should abstain unless it detects "bad faith,
harassment, or some extraordinary circumstance that would make
abstention inappropriate." Middlesex County Ethics Comm.
v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 435 (1982).
Connecticut
Lo v. Board of Zoning Appeals of the City of New Haven
2003 WL
21213336 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 8, 2003)
Z-PRM
Cornerstone, a supportive housing program for people with
disabilities, applied to the Board of Zoning Appeals of the City
of New Haven,
requesting a use variance, several general variances, and
a special exception for additions to its buildings. The board
voted unanimously
to approve all of the requested variances and to grant the
special exception, all pursuant to its obligation to provide
reasonable
accommodations under the Fair Housing Act. Owners of adjoining
property appealed that decision. The court held that a search
of the record revealed ample support for the conclusion that
the proposed
use did not substantially affect the comprehensive zoning
plan and met the municipal criteria for a use variance. The court
held that the remaining variances sought by Cornerstone were
general
variances, necessitated by proposed additions to the structures.
The court held that the record contained substantial evidence
that granting of the special exception would not have an
adverse
impact
on the surrounding area, including the flow of traffic, and
was consistent with the city's obligations under the FHA.
Webster
Bank v. Lorna T. Oakley
265 Conn. 539, 830 A.2d 139 (Conn.
2003)
B-FIN
Ms. Oakley appealed the trial court's decision, claiming
that the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Fair Housing Amendments
Act require a bank, when foreclosing on a mortgage loan, to accommodate
the inability of an individual with a disability to make her loan
payments. After reviewing various sections of the FHAA, the state
Supreme Court concluded that Oakley's claims of discrimination
fell within 42 U.S.C. §3605 and not within 42 U.S.C. §3604.
Because §3605 does not contain a reasonable accommodation
mandate, the court held that the bank was not required to accommodate
Oakley's inability to pay. The court also held that the ADA applies
to mortgage lenders but did not require Webster Bank to afford
Oakley a reasonable modification in its mortgage servicing and
enforcement practices because the ADA operates to afford equal
access to goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and
accommodations, but does not regulate their content.
New York
Town & Country Adult Living v. Village/Town of
Mt. Kisco
2003
WL 21219794 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2003)
Z-PRM
The plaintiffs sought an injunction prohibiting the village
from blocking its efforts to expand an assisted-living residence
for
seniors, claiming the efforts amounted to disability discrimination.
The court denied the village's motions to dismiss, holding that
the complaint adequately alleged a violation of the Fair Housing
Act and Americans with Disabilities Act, and also denied the plaintiff's
motion for preliminary injunction, holding that the plaintiff had
failed to show that there would be irreparable harm and a likelihood
of success on the merits. As to irreparable harm, the plaintiff
failed to proffer financial information to establish that it would
be unable to operate its facility without permission to expand.
Also, at oral argument, the plaintiff said that the facility was
operating at less than full capacity, so there was no showing that
any disabled senior desiring to live at the Town & Country
location had been denied that opportunity because of the defendants'
actions. The plaintiff also did not demonstrate a likelihood of
success on the merits, failing to provide direct evidence of disability-based
discrimination. The court found that because all of the defendants'
concerns in the record were aesthetic and zoning code considerations,
the record was insufficient to support a likelihood of success
in establishing that the defendants' negative actions were based
on intentional discrimination.
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