Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act— Prohibiting Discrimination in the Workplace

Title I of the ADA, which prohibits disability-based employment discrimination, can be found in the United States Code at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117. The federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has the primary responsibility for implementing and enforcing Title I by issuing regulations and other intrepretative materials and investigating allegations of disability-based employment discrimination.

Regulations and Other Interpretive Materials

In 1991, the EEOC issued regulations interpreting Title I, published in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations at 29 C.F.R. Part 1630.

The agency has also issued interim enforcement guidances that set forth its position on important issues, including
1. the ADA's application to employer-provided health insurance;
2. definition of the term "disability";
3. pre-employment disability-related inquires and medical examinations;
4. the interaction between Title I of the ADA and state worker-compensation laws;
5. the ADA's application to individuals with psychiatric disabilities;
6. reasonable accomodation under the ADA;
7. the ADA and psychiatric disabilities;
8. veterans with service-connected disabilities in the workplace.

Although these guidances do not have the force of regulation, they do present the enforcing agency's view and may be given some deference by the courts.

The EEOC has also published a Technical Assistance Manual on Title I and a set of papers and Q and As about Title I, all available through the EEOC's Disability Discrimination webpage. Information can also be obtained from the EEOC field office nearest you or from the national office at 1801 L Street, NW, Washington, DC 20507, 1-800-669-EEOC.

Litigation

Before going to court with a claim of disability discrimination in the workplace, an individual must file a complaint with the EEOC. Between July 26, 1992 and June 30, 1996, people with psychiatric impairments filed 8,536 such complaints. This represents 12.6% of all Title I complaints filed with the EEOC since the ADA's enactment. The agency has litigated a few of these claims, but most cases that reach the federal courts are brought by private plaintiffs.

To date, the outcome of both EEOC and private employment litigation has been mixed for people with mental disabilities. Some of the early cases are summarized below as examples.

EEOC Litigation

When a complaint is made to the EEOC, the agency has the option of litigating the case itself. See the EEOC website.

Private Litigation

If the EEOC has not acted on a discrimination complaint after 180 days, the person who filed the complaint can ask the agency for a "right to sue" letter. The EEOC also issues "right to sue" letters when it completes an investigation, whether or not it finds discrimination. The letter gives a complainant the right to pursue a private employment-discrimination case. Issues in cases brought by people with mental disabilities include:

• The definition of disability
• The nature of reasonable accommodation
• Workplace misconduct

The definition of disability

The ADA's definition of disability requires a person to be "substantially limited" in a major life activity. For people with mental disabilities, this usually means caring for oneself, thinking, concentrating, interacting with others.

Working is also defined as a major life activity. Courts are taking a generally conservative view of whether a person is "substantially limited" in working. However, the Supreme Court has expemted from the ADA's protections individuals whose employment may pose a direct threat to their own health or safety. In Chevron v. Echazabal, the court upheld the use of "qualification standards...that screen out" such employees.

Courts are paying close attention to whether an individual is unable to do only the particular job at issue or, in the words of the EEOC regulations, is unable to do a range or class of jobs.

For example, in Muller v. Automobile Club of Southern California, 897 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Cal. 1995), an insurance company claims adjuster who developed post-traumatic stress disorder after being threatened by a customer was found by the court to be capable of doing similar work for other employers or in other jobs. Thus, the court held, Ms. Muller was not a person with a disability as defined by the ADA.

In addition, although the EEOC says that courts should first examine whether an individual is limited in other activities before examining whether the individual is substantially limited in working, many courts seem to go directly to whether the person is limited in working, or to require detailed evidence from plaintiffs as to how they are substantially limited in non-working activities.

For example, in Mustafa v. Clark County School District, 876 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Nev. 1995), a case decided under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, a teacher who developed panic disorder and anxiety contended that he was substantially limited not only in working but also in other major life activities. The court rejected Mr. Mustafa's claim, however, apparently relying in large part on the fact that Mr. Mustafa's doctors had advised him to engage in physical exercise. Also, although the court acknowledged that Mr. Mustafa's impairment was a barrier to his employment as a teacher, it held that he was not barred from employment generally.

Cases such as Muller and Mustafa indicate that plaintiffs should be prepared to prove to the court that, as a result of their disability, they are capable of doing few if any jobs (e.g., showing that the impairment would disqualify them from performing several work-related tasks). In addition, plaintiffs who plan to assert that they are substantially limited in activities other than working should be prepared to present specific evidence as to how those activities are limited. Plaintiffs might want to present evidence from treating professionals, social workers and peer counselors in as detailed a manner as possible.

The nature of reasonable accommodation

The ADA requires employers to provide a "reasonable accommodation" for employees' (and job applicants') disabilities to enable the employee to perform the essential functions of the job. The ADA very broadly describes what could constitute a reasonable accommodation, including "job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies ... or other similar accommodation."

A potential accommodation is not "reasonable" and need not be provided if the employer can demonstrate that it would create an "undue hardship," i.e., "significant difficulty or expense."

Perhaps because the wording of the statute is so broad, courts have differed on what is "reasonable" in accommodating a particular disabled plaintiff.

In April 2002, the Supreme Court addressed some aspects of the ADA’s reasonable accommodation requirement in US Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002). In a 5-4 opinion, the justices declined to rule, as the airline had requested, that if the accomodation of reassigning an employee to a vacant position conflicts with a seniority system, it must be unreasonable. Rather, the court ruled that while such a reassignment would ordinarily be unreasonable, an employee seeking reassignment may show special circumstances that demonstrate that it is reasonable (for example, reassignment that conflicts with a seniority system may be reasonable where the employer allows other exceptions to the seniority-system rules).

In reaching this decision, the court clarified who has the burden of proof to show that a reasonable accommodation is or is not reasonable. It held that the plaintiff must show that the requested accommodation would ordinarily be or is reasonable “in the run of cases.” Once an employee has shown that a requested accommodation would ordinarily be reasonable, an employer has the burden to demonstrate that the accommodation would be an undue hardship in the particular circumstances. The court rejected the airline’s argument that the ADA does not cover neutral rules that apply across the board rather than singling out people with disabilities; it recognized that reasonable accommodations that treat employees with disabilities differently from others are sometimes required in order to create equal opportunity. 

In the earlier case of a plaintiff with anxiety and depression, Wood v. County of Alameda, No. C-94-1557-THE, 13 ADD 908 (N.D. Cal. 1995), the court ordered the county government to reassign the plaintiff to any vacant position for which she was qualified. Ms. Wood had previously received temporary disability benefits and was cleared to return to work, but not to her old job. She asked for the reasonable accommodation of reassignment to a vacant position, but the county claimed that it only assigned individuals to vacant positions in limited circumstances. The court found, however, that in fact the county government routinely reassigned employees and held that it discriminated against Ms. Wood by failing to make this option available to her.

By contrast, in Mancini v. General Electric Co., 820 F. Supp. 141 (D. Ct. 1993), the court ruled against a plaintiff with an emotional impairment who had been fired after an altercation with his supervisor. Mr. Mancini asserted that he could have performed the essential functions of his job if he had been allowed to transfer away from the supervisor, but the court found this type of accommodation not reasonable. "Employers are entitled to assign personnel as their needs dictate," the court held.

The conflicting results in the Wood and Mancini cases suggest that courts may be far more sympathetic to plaintiffs who, as in Wood, invoke the ADA to gain equal access to something an employer is already providing to others. Mancini illustrates that courts are generally less sympathetic to plaintiffs viewed as asking for "special" treatment." The Mancini court did not undertake any real analysis in deciding that reassigning the plaintiff would create an impermissible "undue burden" for the employer; it simply asserted that reassignment is something an employer shouldn't have to do.

Even though Section 504 and the ADA both indicate that the rules can be bent to accommodate a person with a disability, many courts seem reluctant to force employers to do so. As did the Mancini court, they may ignore Section 504 case law and the explicit provisions of the ADA that contemplate reassignment (at least to a vacant position).

Workplace misconduct

Cases involving individuals with disabilities who have engaged in workplace misconduct illustrate courts' general reluctance to "excuse" the misconduct of disabled employees, even if that misconduct is related to a disability.

For example, Mancini v. General Electric held that the plaintiff was not a "qualified individual with a disability" because he was insubordinate and because the ability to follow orders was an essential function of the job, even though the court seemed to accept the fact that there was a link between his emotional impairments and his insubordinate behavior.

Carroza v. Howard County , 847 F. Supp. 365 (D. Md. 1994), aff'd, 45 F.3d 425 (4th Cir. 1994) (table), held that an employer doesn't violate Section 504 or the ADA by disciplining an employee for misconduct (the plaintiff was fired for "insubordination" and angry "outbursts") even if the misconduct is related to the employee's disability.

A somewhat different view was articulated by the court in a New York Section 504 case, Hogarth v. Thornburgh, 833 F. Supp. 1077 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), concerning an employee with bipolar disorder who was fired for engaging in misconduct related to his disability. Although the defendant asserted that Mr. Hogarth's employment was terminated because of the misconduct, not because he was disabled, the court found that the two issues were intertwined, and that workplace rules have to be analyzed to determine whether they are essential to the job before an employee can be disciplined for breaking these rules. (The court ultimately ruled against the plaintiff, however.)