Olmstead v. L.C.
On June 22, 1999, the United States Supreme Court held in Olmstead
v. L.C. that the unnecessary segregation of individuals
with disabilities in institutions may constitute discrimination
based on disability. The
court ruled that the Americans with Disabilities Act may require states
to provide community-based services rather than institutional
placements
for individuals with disabilities. This historic pronouncement
makes attainable a goal long-sought by people with disabilities and
advocates.
Background and Additional Information
on the Olmstead Decision
Olmstead Implementation
News
Publications, Articles and Reports
Other Legal Resources from the Bazelon Center for Mental Health
Law
More on the Decision
In a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the court affirmed
a ruling by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
that unjustified isolation of individuals with disabilities is properly
regarded as discrimination based on disability. The court held that unjustified
segregation in institutions is discrimination not only because it perpetuates
unwarranted assumptions that people with disabilities are incapable or
unworthy of participating in community life, but also because confinement
in an institution severely curtails everyday life activities, such as
family relations, social contacts, work, educational advancement and cultural
enrichment.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held, the states' need to maintain a range
of facilities for the care and treatment of individuals with diverse mental
disabilities must be recognized. In determining whether a state can successfully
assert a "fundamental alteration" defense (i.e., claim that providing
community-based services to an individual would fundamentally alter the
state's service-delivery system), courts must consider not only the cost
of providing community-based care to the litigants, but also the state's
obligation to mete out services to others with mental disabilities in
an equitable manner. If the state can show that immediate relief for the
plaintiffs would be inequitable "given the responsibility the state has
undertaken for the care and treatment of a large and diverse population
of persons with mental disabilities," it will meet the fundamental alteration
defense. For example, Justice Ginsberg wrote, if the state demonstrates
that it has a "comprehensive, effectively working plan for placing qualified
persons with mental disabilities in less restrictive settings, and a waiting
list that move[s] at a reasonable pace not controlled by the State's endeavors
to keep its institutions fully populated," an individual cannot skip to
the top of the waiting list by filing a lawsuit to obtain community services;
such a move would not be a reasonable modification.
Finally, the court held that a state may generally rely on the "reasonable
assessments of its own professionals" in determining whether a community-based
placement is appropriate. Additionally, the ADA does not require that
community-based treatment be imposedonn individuals who oppose it.
The Olmstead decision should encourage states to begin planning
implementation strategies to comply with the ADA's integration
mandate, spelled out in regulations requiring that services be provided
"in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs" of people with
mental or physical disabilities. All states have already begun moving
in the direction of providing more mental health services in community-based
settings. Nonetheless, to comply with the integration mandate, state mental
health officials will need to take significant steps to move institutionalized
people more quickly into more integrated settings.
The court heard the Georgia case on April 21, 1999. The suit had been
brought by two women with both mental retardation and psychiatric conditions
who were patients in a state hospital. Their treating professionals agreed
that the women should be served in community programs, but no slots were
available for them. Supporting Georgia's appeal to the Supreme Court,
some states argued that, while "virtually any person can safely and appropriately
be served in his or her home (or in the most integrated community setting),"
the cost of doing so would be unduly burdensome.
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