The Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law


 

 

Olmstead v. L.C.

More Information

Read the Bazelon Center's Statement on the 5th Anniversary of the Olmstead Decision (6/21/04)

Bazelon Center Resources on the Olmstead Decision

Olmstead Implementation

Other ADA Supreme Court Cases

Bazelon Center Civil Rights and the Americans with Disabilities Act Issues Page

 

On June 22, 1999, the United States Supreme Court held in Olmstead v. L.C. that the unnecessary segregation of individuals with disabilities in institutions may constitute discrimination based on disability. The court ruled that the Americans with Disabilities Act may require states to provide community-based services rather than institutional placements for individuals with disabilities. This historic pronouncement makes attainable a goal long-sought by people with disabilities and advocates.

Background and Additional Information on the Olmstead Decision

Olmstead Implementation

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Publications, Articles and Reports

Other Legal Resources from the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law

More on the Decision

In a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the court affirmed a ruling by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit that unjustified isolation of individuals with disabilities is properly regarded as discrimination based on disability. The court held that unjustified segregation in institutions is discrimination not only because it perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that people with disabilities are incapable or unworthy of participating in community life, but also because confinement in an institution severely curtails everyday life activities, such as family relations, social contacts, work, educational advancement and cultural enrichment.

Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held, the states' need to maintain a range of facilities for the care and treatment of individuals with diverse mental disabilities must be recognized. In determining whether a state can successfully assert a "fundamental alteration" defense (i.e., claim that providing community-based services to an individual would fundamentally alter the state's service-delivery system), courts must consider not only the cost of providing community-based care to the litigants, but also the state's obligation to mete out services to others with mental disabilities in an equitable manner. If the state can show that immediate relief for the plaintiffs would be inequitable "given the responsibility the state has undertaken for the care and treatment of a large and diverse population of persons with mental disabilities," it will meet the fundamental alteration defense. For example, Justice Ginsberg wrote, if the state demonstrates that it has a "comprehensive, effectively working plan for placing qualified persons with mental disabilities in less restrictive settings, and a waiting list that move[s] at a reasonable pace not controlled by the State's endeavors to keep its institutions fully populated," an individual cannot skip to the top of the waiting list by filing a lawsuit to obtain community services; such a move would not be a reasonable modification.

Finally, the court held that a state may generally rely on the "reasonable assessments of its own professionals" in determining whether a community-based placement is appropriate. Additionally, the ADA does not require that community-based treatment be imposedonn individuals who oppose it.

The Olmstead decision should encourage states to begin planning implementation strategies to comply with the ADA's integration mandate, spelled out in regulations requiring that services be provided "in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs" of people with mental or physical disabilities. All states have already begun moving in the direction of providing more mental health services in community-based settings. Nonetheless, to comply with the integration mandate, state mental health officials will need to take significant steps to move institutionalized people more quickly into more integrated settings.

The court heard the Georgia case on April 21, 1999. The suit had been brought by two women with both mental retardation and psychiatric conditions who were patients in a state hospital. Their treating professionals agreed that the women should be served in community programs, but no slots were available for them. Supporting Georgia's appeal to the Supreme Court, some states argued that, while "virtually any person can safely and appropriately be served in his or her home (or in the most integrated community setting)," the cost of doing so would be unduly burdensome.

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  Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law
1101 15th Street, NW, Suite 1212
Washington, DC 20005

Phone: 202-467-5730
Fax: 202-223-0409
Email: webmaster@bazelon.org

 
Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law
1101 15th Street, NW, Suite 1212
Washington, DC 20005

Phone: 202-467-5730
Fax: 202-223-0409
Email: webmaster@bazelon.org